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Abstract
This paper introduces a variant for the symmetric
matrix-based key distribution in sensor network introduced
by Du et al. Our slight modification shows that the usage
of specific structures for the public matrix instead of fully
random matrix with elements in Zq can reduce the compu-
tation overhead for generating the public key information
and the key itself. An intensive analysis followed by mod-
ified scheme demonstrates the value of our contribution in
relation with the current work and show the equivalence of
the security
1. Introduction
Key pre-distribution (KPD) is a challenging issue in de-
ploying the symmetric key cryptography for wireless sensor
network (WSN). In the KPD, a set of keys or keying mate-
rial is assigned to each node to ensure a secure communi-
cation between the nodes in the real time manner. Due to
the absence of the infrastructure, traditional KPD methods
such like the key distribution center (KDC), where a cen-
tralized authority for key distribution exists, are discarded
and considered infeasible.
To solve the above problem, several works and schemes
have been introduced. These schemes range from the graph-
based cryptographic keys assignment such like the works
in [4, 5, 2] to the more sophisticated online key generation
schemes such like works in [3, 6, 8, 7]. In this paper, we
review of these schemes and provide a construction on it to
reduce its usage of resources while maintaining the same
level of security. The revisited scheme is DDHV in intro-
duced by Du et al. in [3]
We mainly introduce a construction based on the
DDHV scheme to reduce the used computation overhead
with a small additional communication overhead. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We intro-
duce a special construction that reduces the computation
overhead with a small additional communication overhead.
(2) We show a concrete evaluation for the soundness of
the scheme, the security achieved and the resources eval-
uation. (3) To show a comparison between the modified
DDHVscheme and the original work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section
2 introduces an overview of DDHV scheme followed by
our scheme in section 3, section 4 introduces the analysis
of both schemes where we show the overhead evaluation
in terms of communication, computation and memory fol-
lowed by the security analysis. Finally, section 5 draws a
concluding remarks.
2. DDHV scheme
The DDHV scheme in [3] utilizes Blom’s scheme in [1]
with Eschenauer and Gligor’s random key assignment con-
cept in [4]. Roughly speaking, both DDHV and Blom’s
schemes are based on the symmetry concept of matrices to
provide symmetric pairwise keys for the pairs of communi-
cating nodes. DDHV scheme differs in that it utilizes mul-
tiple spaces for generating the key. In this paper, we will
explain the discuss the symmetric matrix-based component
of DDHVas our modification is only related to that part.
Naively, a symmetric matrix of size N ×N can be used
for storing the different N2 keys used for securing commu-
nication within the entire network of size N where each
node si can have a row in that matrix. If two nodes si
and sj would like to communicate securely, they use the
corresponding elements for encrypting and decrypting the
communication traffic symmetrically. That is, Eij is used
in si’s side and Eji is used in sj’s side where both are
equal according to the symmetry of the main matrix. To
reduce the memory requirements, a linear algebraic-based
construction is introduced where the size of the square ma-
trix is reduced into λ ≪ N . In Blom (and therefore in
DDHV) scheme [1], the following are defined: a public ma-
trix G of size (λ + 1)×N and a private symmetric matrix
D of size (λ + 1) × (λ + 1) where elements of G and D
are randomly generated in the finite field Zq . Also, a matrix
A is defined and computed as A = (DG)T which is of
size N × (λ + 1). For any node si, the corresponding row
Ar(i) from A and the corresponding column Gc(i) from
G are selected and loaded in the node’s memory. When si
and sj need to communicate securely, they exchangeGc(i)
and Gc(j) respectively and then kij = Ar(i) × Gc(j) is
computed in the side of si and kji = Ar(j) × Gc(i) is
computed in the side of sj . Obviously, the resulting keys
are equal due to the symmetry property of the matrix D.
To reduce the communication overhead, the DDHV
scheme introduced the a construction of G based on Van-
dermonde matrix which can be represented as in (1) where
each node stores the corresponding field element in the ma-
trix and generate the whole column from that value. Ob-
viously, to construct corresponding column from the given
value, λ number of multiplications over Zq are required.
Similarly, to generate the key by multiplying Ar by Gc,
another λ number of multiplications over Zq is required.
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3. Modified Scheme (OR-DDHV)
Our modification for the above DDHV scheme relies in
reducing the computation overhead with a slight increment
in the used communication overhead while maintaining the
same security level. That is, we re-design the public matrix
G in such a way that maximize the number of zeros leading
to that the inner multiplications used for generating the key
are made as few as possible. Also, when several elements
are set to zero in the matrixG, additional overhead required
for reconstructing the public information when exchanging
it will be discarded.
Let the matrix (2) represents GT in which each row
has only two nonzero values. According to the above
DDHV scheme, each node has a column in G represented
by two non-zero values. Based on the GT , we define the
ofline and online phases in the following sections.
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3.1. Offline Phase
1. The administrator generates a symmetric matrix D of
size λ × λ with elements in Zq and the public matrix
G of size λ×N with elements in Zq whereG satisfies
the above restrictions.
2. The administrator computesA =GTD. The resulting
A is of size N×λ and therefore its elements are in Zq .
3. For each node si, the administrator assigns the row
with index i from the matrix A (e.g., Ar(i)) and col-
umn with index i from the matrix G (i.e., Gc(i)).
3.2. Online phase
The online phase consists of the following steps:
1. Firstly, two nodes si and sj exchange their pub-
lic columns Gc(i) and Gc(i) which can be repre-
sented as two non-zero values in Zq and denoted as
g1i, g2i, g1i, g2j .
2. In a vector Gc(j) with zero elements, the node si sets
the received g1i and g2j from the node sj with the iden-
tifier j into following positions in Gc(j):
Gc(j)[j mod λ]← g1j .
Gc(j)[(j + 1) mod λ]← g2j .
3. Similarly, the node sj reconstruct Gc(i) by plugging
the received values g1i, g2i in the following positions:
Gc(i)[i mod λ]← g1i
Gc(i)[(i + 1) mod λ]← g2i
4. The node si computes kij = Ar(i)Gc(j).
5. The node sj computes kji = Ar(j)Gc(i).
4. Analysis
4.1. Limitations on the Network Size
The maximum supported network size in our scheme is
merely dependent on the parameters N and λ. In order to
avoid a possible collision and maintain the vectors of G
independent, maximum network size is set to N = 2× λ.
4.2. Equivalence of keys
We can simply show that the generated key are equal.
That is equivalent to showing that if D symmetric then
B = GTDG is also symmetric and therefore the resulting
keys are equal at both sides of si and sj . To show the sym-
metry of B, it is enough to demonstrate that B = BT . That
is, BT =
(
GTAG
)T
= GT
(
GTA
)T
= GTATG =
GTATG = B. Since both kij and kji are elements in B
which is symmetric, both keys are equal.
Let aij , dij and gij be the (i, j) elements in the matrices
A,D and G respectively. Also, let A = (DG)T . From
which we would like to show that kij = Ar(i)Gc(j) and
kji = Ar(j)Gc(i) are equal.
Proof.
We can write aij with corresponding to its multipliers
as follows:aij = (
∑λ
k=1 dikgki)
T = (
∑λ
k=1 dikgki)
From which we can write Ar(i) = [a1i, a2i, . . . ] =[∑λ
k=1 d1kgki,
∑λ
k=1 d2kgki, . . .
]
and Gc(j) =
[(g1j , g2j, . . . )]. The resulting of Ar(i) × Gc(j) can
be written as follows:
Ar(i)Gc(j) =
λ∑
l=1
(
λ∑
k=1
dlkgki
)
glj (3)
Similarly, we can show that Ar(j)Gc(i) =∑λ
l=1(
∑λ
k=1 dlkgkj)gli. Now, we would like to check
whether Ar(j)Gc(i) = Ar(i)Gc(j) for any i 6= j. That is,
we would like to show the following equality.
λ∑
l=1
(
λ∑
k=1
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)
glj
?
=
λ∑
l=1
(
λ∑
k=1
dlkgkj
)
gli (4)
By Taking the right side in (4) and change the index of
the summations we get the that:
∑λ
l=1(
∑λ
k=1 dlkgkj)gli =∑λ
k=1(
∑λ
l=1 dklgli)gki =
∑λ
k=1(
∑λ
l=1 dlkgli)gki.
Because D is symmetric, gli = gil, therefore the above
can be rewritten as:
∑λ
l=1 dl1gljg1i +
∑λ
l=1 dl2gljg2i +
· · · = (d11g1jg1i + d21g2jg1i + d31g3jg1i + . . . ) +
(d12g1jg2i + d22g2jg2i + d32g3jg2i + . . . ) + (d13g1jg3i +
d23g2jg3i + d33g3jg3i + . . . ) + . . . . By resuming and ar-
ranging the terms we get the following:
= g1j
λ∑
k=1
d1kgki + g2j
λ∑
k=1
d2kgki + . . .
=
λ∑
l=1
glj
λ∑
k=1
dlkgki =
λ∑
l=1
(
λ∑
k=1
dlkgki
)
glj (5)
From (3) and (5), we get that (4) holds. 
4.3. Resources overhead
• Communication overhead: The communication in
the OR-DDHV scheme is 2 log2 2q = 2 × q while it
is q bits in the DDHV scheme when transferring a sin-
gle field value from which the corresponding column
in A is generated.
• Computation overhead: The computation overhead
in DDHV and OR-DDHV is two parts. First the first
part is required for reconstructing the public informa-
tion from the field element and the second part is re-
quired for computing the inner product to generate the
symmetric key.
– Column’s reconstruction computation: The
computation required in OR-DDHV scheme to
reconstruct the corresponding column is negli-
gible while it is λ number of multiplications in
the field Zq in DDHV scheme. That is, when
λ is large, the number of computations over q
will be also large. To illustrate how the recon-
struction works for the case of DDHV scheme,
given si, any element in the column is the result
of multiplying the two previous elements. That
is, si = 1× si, (si)2 = si × si and so on.
– Computation for inner product: The compu-
tation for the inner product between the column
from G and the row from A to obtain the sym-
metric key is 2 multiplications in our scheme
since only two values are non-zero in G’s cor-
responding column. On contrast, λ number of
multiplications in the field Zq are required in the
case of DDHV scheme.
To sum up, the required computation overhead in term
of multiplications in Zq is 2 multiplications for OR-
DDHV and 2λ multiplications for DDHV.
• Memory overhead: For simplicity, we consider that
the required memory is only for storing the corre-
sponding row in A for the node si in its memory. Re-
calling that the elements of A are in Zq and the length
of each row in A is λ elements, the required memory
in OR-DDHV is same like the required memory in
DDHV which is equal to λ× q bit.
A summary of the comparison in terms of the required
resources is shown in Table 1. Note that though the commu-
nication overhead in OR-DDHV is higher than in DDHV ,
it is still constant since q is fixed to accumulate the proper
length of key. On contrast, the computation in the OR-
DDHV is constant while it increase linearly according to
the security parameter λ in DDHV.
Table 1. Comparison between DDHV and OR-
DDHV in term of the used resources where
communication and memory are in bit per
node and computation is in term of multipli-
cations in the finite field Zq.
algorithm communication computation memory
DDHV q 2λ λ× q
OR-DDHV 2q 2 λ× q
4.4 Security Analysis
The security analysis follows the analysis shown in
DDHV or Blom work. That is, the system is λ-secure which
leads to that an adversary needs to know λ number of dif-
ferent linearly independent elements (i.e., rows or columns)
from the key generation construction to be able to know
the keys between uncompromised nodes. Recall G in (2),
A, and D defined above. Also recall that aij and dij are
the (i, j) elements of A and D respectively. Now we can
define Ar(i) as Ar(i) = [ ai1 ai2 . . . aiλ ] where
aij =
(∑λ
k=1 dikgki
)T
=
(∑λ
k=1 dikgki
)
. The above A
can be rewritten as:
A =


(g11d11 + g12d21) (g11d12 + g12d22) . . .
(g22d21 + g23d31) (g22d22 + g23d32) . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

 (6)
An adversary who would like to attack the above system
must first reconstruct the proper D. Since D is in Zλ×λ,
λ2 number of linear equations are required for reconstruct-
ing it. That is, given that G, the systematic structure of A
and G, and the symmetric property of D is publicly known
information to the adversary, the adversary can obtain λ
different linear equations by attacking a single node and
reconstructing the different equations representing the row
Ar(i). By attacking the nodes with the ID 1, the attacker
will have the following:a11 = g11d11 + g12d21, a12 =
g11d12 + g12d22, a13 = g11d13 + g12d23, . . . .
By repeating the physical attack to λ different nodes, the
adversary can construct λ2 linear equation with λ2 variables
that can be solved to recover the whole private matrix D
and construct any pairwise key between any pair of uncom-
promised nodes by just observing their public information.
Note that the existence of multiple zeros in the G will not
reduce the hardness of solving the above linear system since
the different elements of the matrix D always exist in the
resulting linear construction in A. In DDHVscheme, how-
ever, all variables (represent by the different d’s) appear in
each equation rather than the two variables in each as shown
above.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced a variant for DDHV work. We
demonstrated that the usage of the orthogonal matrix in-
stead of fully random matrix with elements in Zq will lead
to a great reduction in the overhead represented by the com-
putation required for generating the public key material and
the key itself.
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